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JOHN F. COYLE* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (“CISG”) operates as an “international” 
version of UCC Article 2—it supplies the governing law when a 
U.S. company enters into a contract for the sale of goods with a 
foreign counterparty.  Scholars have long debated the role the 
CISG plays in contract practice in the United States.  Some argue 
that the CISG has come to be embraced, if slowly, by U.S. law-
yers.  Others contend that the CISG has yet to achieve wide-
spread acceptance within the U.S. legal community.  Prior stud-
ies have sought to resolve this debate by looking to surveys of 
practicing attorneys.  This Article seeks to shed light on this 
question by looking to actual contracts entered into by U.S. 
companies. 
The Article draws upon a hand-collected dataset of more 
than 5,000 contracts, along with interviews with several lawyers 
who had a hand in their drafting, in an attempt to better under-
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stand the role that the CISG plays in U.S. contract practice.  The 
Article shows that: (1) many U.S. companies reflexively exclude 
the CISG without inquiring as to whether it would apply of its 
own force; (2) U.S. companies virtually never select the CISG as 
the law to govern their agreements; (3) there is no industry or 
geographic location within the United States where the CISG 
has been affirmatively embraced; (4) some U.S. companies that 
had selected the CISG in the past now have a policy of exclud-
ing it from their contracts; and (5) U.S. companies are frequently 
unaware that selecting the law of a U.S. state can result in the 
application of the CISG.  
These findings suggest a number of important insights.  
First, they show that past surveys of U.S. lawyers dramatically 
overstate the extent to which the CISG has gained acceptance 
within the U.S. legal community.  Second, they indicate that 
contract practice with respect to the CISG can and does vary 
from nation to nation.  The dataset contracts show that Chinese 
solar companies, in contrast to their U.S. counterparts, have em-
braced the CISG.  Finally, they highlight the potential unfairness 
of requiring unsophisticated U.S. companies to litigate interna-
tional contract disputes under a set of treaty rules that are rou-
tinely avoided by their more sophisticated brethren. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
When the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (“CISG”) entered into force on January 1, 
1988, it was heralded as a singular achievement in the annals of 
private international law.1  Scholars were quick to extol the CISG as 
“a ‘quantum leap,’ a ‘new legal lingua franca,’ a ‘milestone,’ a ‘tri-
umph of comparative legal work’ and ‘arguably the greatest legis-
lative achievement aimed at harmonizing private commercial 
law.’”2  They praised its drafters for creating a uniform interna-
tional sales law “that promotes fair and honorable solutions with-
out affording any obvious or hidden advantages to either side.”3  
They spoke of the treaty’s importance as a solution to choice-of-law 
problems that had long bedeviled national courts.4  And they mar-
veled at the speed with which various nations around the world 
(including the United States) had acted to ratify the CISG.5  Judged 
                                                     
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter 
CISG]; Kevin Bell, The Sphere of Application of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 237, 23738 (1996) (“The United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods is ‘rapidly 
becoming one of the most successful multi-lateral treaties ever in the field of 
agreements designed to unify rules traditionally addressed only in domestic legal 
systems.’”) (footnote omitted). 
2 Bell, supra note 1, at 238 (footnotes omitted); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, The 
Scholarly Response to the Harmonization of International Sales Law, 30 J.L. & COM. 1, 21 
(2011) (“From humble beginnings, the CISG has grown to be an international 
phenomenon.  It is no longer premature to hail it as the first successful unification 
of international sales law.  It is the culmination of the dream presented by Ernst 
Rabel in the 1920s.”). 
3 Susanne Cook, CISG: From the Perspective of the Practitioner, 17 J.L. & COM. 
343, 350 (1998).  
4 See Fritz Enderlein & Dietrich Maskow, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 1 (1992); 
see also Franco Ferrari, PIL and CISG: Friends or Foes?, 31 J.L. & COM. 45, 4648 
(2013).  
5 See UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, STATUS UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html 
[https://perma.cc/2P2E-79QM] (last visited Dec. 7, 2016) [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL, Status on CISG] (listing eighty-five contracting parties to the CISG); 
see also Peter Huber, Some Introductory Remarks on the CISG, 6 INTERNATIONALES 
HANDELSRECHT [INT’L TRADE L.] 228, 228 (2006) (“The CISG is in force in more than 
60 States from all parts of the world, among them both industrial nations and de-
veloping states. . . . It is therefore fair to say that the CISG has in fact been one of 
the success stories in the field of the international unification of private law.”) 
(footnote omitted).  
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in accordance with these metrics—skillful drafting, substantive 
harmonization, and number of ratifications—there can be little 
doubt that the CISG is a runaway success story.  Indeed, by these 
metrics the CISG ranks among the most successful commercial law 
treaties in modern history. 
Judged in accordance with a different metric—how frequently 
private parties actually use the CISG—the evidence of success is 
less clear.  The CISG specifically provides that contracting parties 
are free to exclude it from their contracts.6  In cases where the CISG 
is excluded, the contracts will be governed by national sales law.  
Several recent surveys of attorneys in the United States and Europe 
suggest that more than half of respondents in some jurisdictions 
routinely urge their clients to exclude the CISG from their con-
tracts.7  These surveys suggest that a sizeable number of attorneys 
routinely advise clients engaged in international sales transactions 
to “opt out” of a set of international rules whose sole purpose is to 
facilitate those transactions and “opt in” to a set of national rules of 
general application.  If these surveys are accurate, they call into 
question whether the CISG is achieving its intended purpose of fa-
cilitating international trade by reducing legal uncertainty in inter-
national transactions. 
This Article represents the first attempt to look at non-survey 
data in order to determine the extent to which private actors actu-
ally use the CISG.8  It draws upon an original dataset of more than 
5,000 contracts in an attempt to determine the extent to which pri-
vate parties select or exclude the treaty in their international sales 
                                                     
6 See CISG art. 6.  Although the CISG constitutes a set of default rules, these 
rules are “sticky” in that they will apply unless the parties expressly opt out.  For 
a discussion on how to interpret contractual silence in a world of sticky default 
rules, see infra Section 3.2. 
7 See infra notes 63 - 86  and accompanying text (discussing exclusion of CISG 
from U.S. contracts).  
8 Another recent study adopted a similar methodology, albeit with respect to 
a different contract dataset, to explore why parties draft choice-of-law clauses that 
select national law in their international contracts.  See Gilles Cuniberti, The Inter-
national Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 455, 455 (2014).  Cuniberti’s conclusion that transacting parties tend to choose 
English and Swiss law more frequently than the law of other nations is generally 
consistent with the findings set forth in this Article.  See infra note 106 (explaining 
how foreign counterparties sometimes prefer to have the law of England govern 
its international sales contracts over U.S. law); see also Gilles Cuniberti, The Laws of 
Asian International Business Transactions, 25 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 35, 35 (2016) 
(finding that English law, U.S. law, and, to a lesser extent, Singapore law domi-
nate the market for law in international contracts in Asia). 
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agreements.9  It also draws upon a number of interviews with in-
house attorneys at U.S. companies in an attempt to better under-
stand the factors that influence international choice-of-law deci-
sions at the company level.  These sources give rise to a number of 
specific findings with respect to U.S. contract practice as it relates 
to the CISG. 
First, U.S. companies routinely exclude the CISG from contracts 
to which it would never apply.  It is common, for example, for U.S. 
companies to exclude the CISG from (1) wholly domestic agree-
ments, (2) contracts not for the sale of goods, and (3) contracts with 
a foreign counterparty that has its principal place of business in a 
nation that has not ratified the CISG.  This pattern of practice sug-
gests that many U.S. companies reflexively exclude the CISG from 
their contracts.  
Second, the number of U.S. companies that affirmatively 
choose the CISG is negligible.  While it is not strictly necessary for 
the parties to select the CISG in order for it to govern their contract, 
there are many good reasons why they may wish to do so if, in 
fact, they want it to provide the governing law.  The fact that a 
vanishingly small number of U.S. companies have done so in re-
cent years suggests that the treaty has gained little ground as an al-
ternative to national sales law within the U.S. legal community. 
Third, the CISG lacks any clear locus of support within the 
United States.  A comprehensive review of the dataset contracts in 
which the CISG was chosen as the governing law failed to identify 
any particular U.S. industry or U.S. state in which that treaty has 
been embraced.  To the extent that the CISG has a constituency in 
the United States, that constituency appears to consist principally 
of law professors.  There is no evidence suggesting that it has been 
widely embraced by private actors actually engaged in buying and 
selling goods in international trade. 
Fourth, the CISG derives remarkably little support today even 
among those companies that have selected it to govern their con-
tracts in the past.  Several of the companies that had chosen the 
CISG as the governing law in prior contracts now report that their 
first preference is for contracts to be governed by the law of their 
home nation.  Their second preference is for the national sales law 
of a neutral third country.  The CISG is chosen only as a last resort 
in contracting situations that present idiosyncratic issues that arise 
                                                     
9 See infra notes 5156 and accompanying text (discussing the process by 
which this Article’s dataset was assembled). 
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infrequently in the ordinary course of business. 
Fifth, companies in other countries have proved more welcom-
ing with respect to the CISG than U.S. companies.  Chinese solar 
companies, for example, are CISG enthusiasts. They routinely 
choose it to govern their international sales agreement.  While 
there is an element of self-interest here—Chinese national sales law 
mirrors the CISG in many respects—the contracts dataset suggest 
that the CISG has achieved a greater level of acceptance in China 
than it has in the United States. 
Finally, there is no evidence that U.S. companies knowingly se-
lect the CISG “indirectly” when they choose to have their interna-
tional supply contracts governed by the law of a U.S. state without 
referencing the CISG.  A number of U.S. judges have reasoned that 
because the law of the State of New York necessarily includes fed-
eral law, and federal law necessarily includes properly ratified 
treaties like the CISG, the choice of New York law amounts to a de 
facto selection of the CISG.10  However attractive this syllogism 
may seem as a matter of logic, it is inconsistent with the lived expe-
riences of many U.S. companies that are unaware that the selection 
of New York law may result in the application of the CISG. 
In summary, the evidence derived from a review of the availa-
ble contracts paints a far bleaker picture than do existing attorney 
surveys with respect to the role of the CISG in U.S. contract prac-
tice.  These findings have significant implications for the ongoing 
scholarly debate as to the impact of the CISG.  Some scholars have 
taken the position that “[e]ven though much has been written 
about the skepticism of commercial practice towards the Conven-
tion and of the CISG’s allegedly minor role in the legal community, 
today this position may be regarded as by and large disproven.”11  
Other scholars have argued that “the claim that the CISG is gener-
ally being excluded in practice, although still often heard and read, 
is not supported by empirical evidence.”12  Though one must be 
cautious not to read too much into a single study, the empirical ev-
idence presented in this Article suggests that U.S. attorneys are 
quite skeptical of the CISG and that U.S. companies do regularly 
                                                     
10 See, e.g., Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. SaintGobain Tech. Fabrics Can. 
Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 108182 (D. Minn. 2007).  
11 Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISGSuccesses and Pitfalls, 57 
AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 458 (2009) (footnote omitted). 
12 Ulrich G. Schroeter, Empirical Evidence of Courts’ and Counsels’ Approach to 
the CISG (with Some Remarks on Professional Liability), in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 
A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 649, 66768 (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014). 
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exclude this treaty from their international supply agreements.13  
These findings squarely contract the claims made by the scholars 
quoted above.   
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part 2 offers a brief history of 
the CISG and reviews the existing empirical scholarship as it re-
lates to CISG opt outs.  Part 3 describes the methodology used in 
assembling the primary dataset of contracts used in this Article.  
Part 4 draws upon this dataset, along with a number of supple-
mental interviews with individuals who helped to draft these 
agreements, to describe the role that the CISG plays in U.S. contract 
practice today.  Part 5 discusses how and why the patterns of prac-
tice in China currently differ from those in the United States.  Part 
6 describes the methodology used in assembling a secondary da-
taset of contracts.  It then draws upon interviews with individuals 
who helped to draft these agreements to show that U.S. companies 
that select the law of a U.S. state to govern their international sup-
ply agreements generally do not intend for these contracts to be 
governed by the CISG. 
 
 
2.  THE EXISTING EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
On April 11, 1980, representatives of sixty-two nations voted 
unanimously to approve the text of the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.14  This vote 
marked the culmination of more than twelve years of drafting 
work conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).15  The treaty 
outlined uniform rules relating to contract formation, the statute of 
frauds, anticipatory breach, damages, and other substantive rules 
                                                     
13 See also Peter L. Fitzgerald, The International Contracting Practices Survey 
Project: An Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the United Nations Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the Unidroit Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, Jurists, and Legal Academics in the United States, 
27 J.L. & COM. 1, 25 (2008) (arguing that the CISG is “still largely unknown and 
seldom seen in practice today.”). 
14 JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 3 (3d ed. 1999). 
15 See id. at 910 (describing the draft process organized by UNCITRAL, 
which culminated in a final draft finalized by 62 states and eight international or-
ganizations in March 1980).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/4
  
2016] ROLE OF CISG 203 
of contract law that would apply to international sales agreements.  
When the CISG entered into force on January 1, 1988, it had been 
ratified by eleven nations, including the United States.  As of De-
cember 2016, the CISG had been ratified by eighty-five nations.16  
Significantly, the list of ratifying countries includes nations from all 
corners of the world and nations at all levels of economic devel-
opment. 
In the many scholarly books and articles written about the 
CISG over the past several decades, the treaty is typically described 
as a resounding success story across three specific dimensions.17  
First, scholars praise the text of the treaty for providing clear legal 
rules that may be easily understood by attorneys from many dif-
ferent legal traditions.18  Second, scholars note that the CISG repre-
                                                     
16 UNCITRAL, Status on CISG, supra note 5 (listing ratifying nations). 
17 See generally Martin Karollus, Judicial Interpretation and Application of the 
CISG in Germany 19881994, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 51, 77 (Cornell Int’l Law Review ed., 1995) 
(“The CISG seems to be well on the way to becoming the Magna Carta of interna-
tional trade.”); Volker Behr, The Sales Convention in Europe: From Problems in Draft-
ing to Problems in Practice, 17 J.L. & COM. 263, 264 (1998) (“From the point of view 
of legislation as well as from the point of view of practical application, the Con-
vention seems to be a success.”); Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Flechtner, Arbitra-
tion and Contract Formation in International Trade: First Interpretations of the U.N. 
Sales Convention, 12 J.L. & COM. 239, 239 (1993) (“The acceptance of the rules of 
CISG by nations with widely-differing domestic legal systems located on every 
inhabited continent holds the promise of a quantum jump in the uniformity of le-
gal rules governing sales transactions, with significant benefits for international 
trade.”); Michael P. Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation 
Through the Prism of Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1996) (“It 
can be said with little risk of overstatement that the [CISG] represents one of his-
tory’s most successful efforts at the unification of the law governing international 
transactions.”) (footnote omitted); Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 11, at 478 
(“All in all the story of the CISG has been one of worldwide success. Criticism that 
has been put forward can largely be either rejected as unfounded to begin with or 
met by a correct interpretation of the Convention.”). 
18 See Joseph M. Lookofsky, Loose Ends and Contorts in International Sales: Prob-
lems in the Harmonization of Private Law Rules, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 403, 404 (1991) 
(stating that the CISG is “‘relatively straightforward and uncluttered with detail,’ 
not only because domestic anacronisms [sic] have been refined away, but also be-
cause some unsightly loose ends were tucked under the rug.”) (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 69 (1st ed. 1982)); HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 8 
(praising skill and dedication of UNCITRAL Secretariat, who aids with “analyz-
ing the divergences among the existing legal rules; reports on commercial practic-
es to assist in making a choice among alternative solutions to pirvotal [sic] factual 
examples; draft statutory texts formulated, at crucial spots, with clearly labelled 
alternatives to facilitate debate and decision with a minimum of confusion or mis-
understanding.”); Cook, supra note 3, at 345 n.12 (“UNCITRAL skillfully executed 
its plan of drafting a sales convention based upon input from all interest 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
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sents a solution to choice-of-law problems that had long bedeviled 
national courts.19  By harmonizing the substantive international 
law of sales, the CISG largely eliminated the need for a national 
court to conduct a choice-of-law analysis in cases involving inter-
national sales.20  Third, scholars cite the number of ratifications to 
date as evidence of the CISG’s success.21  It was and remains quite 
rare for a commercial law treaty to gain such widespread ac-
ceptance in the international community.22 
 
                                                                                                                        
groups.”). 
19 See Paul Schiff Berman, The Inevitable Legal Pluralism Within Universal Har-
monization Regimes: The Case of the CISG, 21 UNIFORM L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (“To its 
backers, the CISG addresses intractable problems of legal uncertainty and forum 
shopping, creating a stable global law of trade.”); John F. Coyle, Rethinking the 
Commercial Law Treaty, 45 GA. L. REV. 343, 345 (2011) (discussing the problem of 
legal uncertainty in international transactions) (footnote omitted). 
20 See Henry Mather, Choice of Law for International Sales Issues Not Resolved by 
the CISG, 20 J.L. & COM. 155, 155 (2001) (observing that the CISG “should substan-
tially reduce the need for choice of law by American courts.”); see also John 
Felemegas, Introduction, in AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE 
OF GOODS (1980) AS UNIFORM SALES LAW 1, 4 (John Felemegas ed., 2007) (“A uni-
form law would provide parties with greater certainty as to their potential rights 
and obligations.  This is to be compared with the results brought about by the 
amorphous principles of private international law and the possible application of 
an unfamiliar system of foreign domestic law.”) (footnote omitted).  Where a con-
tract dispute turns on issues outside of the ambit of the CISG, of course, it will still 
be necessary for a national court to engage in a choice-of-law analysis with respect 
to those issues.  See CISG art. 4(a). 
21 See del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Contract Conclusion under CISG, 16 J.L. & 
COM. 315, 315 (1997) (“This wide acceptance on the part of states with different 
social, legal, and economic systems demonstrates the considerable success 
achieved by the Convention.”); see also Alejandro M. Garro, Perspectives, Reconcil-
iation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods, 23 INT’L LAW. 443, 482 (1989) (“UNCITRAL’s success in adopting a Con-
vention with wider acceptability is evidenced by the fact that the original eleven 
States for which the Convention came into force . . . included countries from every 
geographical region, every stage of economic development, and every major legal, 
social, and economic system.”); Cook, supra note 3, at 349 (“CISG has been a tre-
mendous international success: . . . it has been accepted by fifty Contracting States 
as the law that governs the international sale of good.”) (footnote omitted); Schro-
eter, supra note 12, at 649 (observing CISG has been ratified by fifteen of the 
world’s twenty leading exporters and is “the law applicable to 75% of the world’s 
exports and imports . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
22 Only a few commercially important nations, including the United King-
dom, India, and Taiwan, have declined to ratify the CISG.  In the annals of inter-
national commercial law, only the New York Convention, which addresses the 
topic of international commercial arbitration, has been ratified by more nations 
than the CISG. 
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All of these accolades are entirely deserved.  The CISG is an 
impressive feat of legal draftsmanship.  The CISG does offer a po-
tential solution to perennial problem of indeterminate choice-of-
law rules.  And the CISG has been ratified by a remarkable number 
of nations.  All too often, however, scholarly accounts fail to men-
tion perhaps the most important metric for evaluating the success 
of the CISG:  whether contracting parties actually use it in their pri-
vate transactions.  On this metric, the evidence of the CISG’s suc-
cess is less clear cut.23 
In order to understand why widespread ratification of the 
CISG may not automatically translate into widespread usage by 
private parties, it is useful to review the rules that determine when 
the CISG will and will not supply the governing law in private 
sales contracts.  By its terms, the CISG applies to (1) contracts for 
the sale of goods between (2) parties whose places of business are 
in different nations when (3) at least one of the nations in question 
has ratified the CISG.24  It is possible, however, for parties to opt 
out of the CISG.25  If the parties exclude the CISG by writing a 
clause to that effect into their contracts, the treaty will not supply 
the governing law.  In such cases, the contract will be governed by 
the national sales law selected by the parties or, if no such law is 
selected, then by the national sales law chosen after the court per-
forms a choice-of-law analysis.  This ability of private parties to opt 
out of the CISG means that looking solely to whether a country has 
ratified the CISG is an imperfect proxy for determining the extent 
to which the CISG is used by private actors.  One must also inquire 
as to whether these parties regularly exercise their rights under the 
CISG to exclude that treaty as a source of law. 
In recent years, a number of scholars have sought to determine 
how frequently contracting parties choose to exclude the CISG 
from their international sales contracts by conducting surveys of 
                                                     
23 Jan M. Smits, Problems of Uniform Laws, in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A 
GLOBAL CHALLENGE 605, 607 (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014) (“[I]n every case in 
which a party is aware of the existence of the CISG and its potential applicability 
to the contract, there is an empirical test of its usefulness.”). 
24 See CISG art. 1.  The United States has made a declaration under article 95 
of the CISG stipulating that it will only apply to contracts involving a U.S. party 
where both of the nations have ratified the CISG.  See infra note 63.  
25 Article 6 of the CISG provides that “[t]he parties may exclude the applica-
tion of this Convention or . . . derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provi-
sions.”  CISG art. 6. 
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practicing attorneys.26  In the United States, for example, three sur-
veys conducted between 2004 and 2007 found that between 55% 
and 71% of U.S. attorneys typically advised their clients to opt out 
of the CISG.27  In Germany, two surveys conducted in 2004 found 
that between 45% and 73% of German attorneys usually recom-
mended that their clients opt out.28  In Austria, a survey conducted 
in 2007 found that 55% of Austrian attorneys typically recom-
mended opting out.29  In Switzerland, a survey conducted in 2008 
found that 62% of Swiss attorneys recommend opting out at least 
some of the time.30  In China, by contrast, a survey conducted in 
2007 found that only 37% of Chinese attorneys typically urged 
their clients to opt out of the CISG.31  Taken as a whole, these sur-
veys suggest that more than half of the attorney respondents in a 
number of important commercial jurisdictions routinely counsel 
their clients to exclude the CISG from their international sales con-
tracts.32 
In late 2009, UNCITRAL provided logistical support for a re-
                                                     
26 For a thorough overview of the empirical data on this topic, see LISA 
SPAGNOLO, CISG EXCLUSION AND LEGAL EFFICIENCY 15052, 21218 (2014) (compar-
ing surveys from 2008 and 2011 on CISG international rates of exclusion that indi-
cate downward trend in automatic CISG exclusion rates).  
27 See Martin F. Koehler & Guo Yujun, The Acceptance of the Unified Sales Law 
(CISG) in Different Legal Systems, 20 PACE INT’L L. REV. 45, 46 – 48 (2008) (explain-
ing how 20042005 surveys conducted with U.S. practitioners indicated that 55.6% 
“mostly explicitly excluded” the CISG from their contracts); George V. Philip-
popoulos, Awareness of the CISG Among American Attorneys, 40 UCC L.J. 357, 361, 
363 (2008); Fitzgerald, supra note 13, at 67 tbl.11 (showing 55% of U.S. practitioners 
“[s]pecifically opt out of applying the CISG to the transaction”). 
28 SPAGNOLO, supra note 26, at 151 n.6. 
29 Id. at 151.  
30 Corinne Widmer & Pascal Hachem, Switzerland, in THE CISG AND ITS 
IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 281, 285 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2008).  That same 
survey found that Swiss attorneys were five times more likely to exclude the CISG 
than to select it. Id. 
31 See Koehler & Guo, supra note 27, at 50 (“The second most often selected 
reason in China [for exclusion] was ‘because it is not possible to dissuade our 
business partners or the business partners of our client from the application of 
their national law’”) (alteration in original); see also SPAGNOLO, supra note 26, at 215 
n.176. 
32 There is evidence that some contracts between Japanese chemical compa-
nies and their U.S. counterparties exclude the CISG.  See Yoshimochi Taniguchi, 
Deepening Confidence in the Application of CISG to the Sales Agreements Between the 
United States and Japanese Companies, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 277, 279 (2013) 
(“[I]n most [U.S.Japanese] contracts, the CISG was excluded due to concerns 
about how the CISG would be interpreted and/or incompatibility with U.S. or 
Japanese law or both.”). 
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search project that became known as the Global Sales Law sur-
vey.33  The survey invited approximately 9,000 people from around 
the world to respond to an online survey.34  These individuals were 
drawn from four target groups, including practicing attorneys, ar-
bitrators, businesses engaged in trade, and law professors, and 
those who responded to the survey were located in eighty-eight 
different countries.35  The survey ultimately generated 640 re-
sponses, eighty-five of which came from the United States, that 
shed light on global practice as it relates to CISG exclusions.36  The 
survey found 12% of U.S. respondents “always” opted out, 42% 
“sometimes” opted out, and 46% “never or rarely” opted out.37  
The numbers for respondents  across all CISG member states were 
13% “always” opting out, 32% “sometimes” opting out, and 55% 
“never or rarely” opting out.38  The Global Sales Law survey sug-
gests, therefore, that: (1) approximately 45% of all respondents 
sometimes or always chose to exclude the CISG from their con-
tracts; and (2) this number jumps to 54% when one looks exclusive-
ly at respondents within the United States. 
Why do so many attorneys across so many jurisdictions advise 
their clients to exclude the CISG?  Scholars have advanced a num-
ber of possible explanations.  First, there is the problem of lack of 
familiarity.39  Attorneys are more likely to be familiar with their 
own national sales law than they are with an international treaty 
and, consequently, are more likely to recommend that their clients 
choose to have their contracts governed by the law they know 
best.40  Second, and relatedly, many attorneys will never have oc-
                                                     
33 See INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL 
SALES AND CONTRACT LAW 70 (2012) (“The Global Sales Law survey was conducted 
online towards the end of 2009 and was supported by the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).  The survey was conducted in 
the six UN languages.”) (footnote omitted). 
34 Id. 
35 See id. (“Approximately 5,000 individuals received personally addressed 
letters in United Nations envelopes, and there were four target 
groupspractising [sic] lawyers, arbitrators, businesses engaging in trade, and 
law schools.”). 
36 See id. (“The survey website received more than 1,500 hits and 640 useable 
responses.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 70 n.23 (listing number of responses from 
each jurisdiction).  
37 Id. at 73.  
38 Id.  
39 See SPAGNOLO, supra note 26, at 15255. 
40 See id. at 153.  Some scholars have argued that attorneys who advise their 
clients to exclude the CISG on lack of familiarity grounds are in breach of their 
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casion to litigate or arbitrate a case in which the CISG provides the 
governing law.41  Given this reality, it is rational for these attorneys 
not to invest substantial time and energy into educating them-
selves as to the CISG’s content, which in turn makes it more likely 
that they will recommend that their clients exclude it from their 
sales contracts.42 
Third, some legal scholars in the United States have argued 
that the substantive content of the CISG does a poorer job than 
does the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) at approximating the 
unstated preferences of the parties, and is therefore a relatively less 
efficient set of default rules.43  To the extent that practicing attor-
neys share these views, they may urge their clients to avoid the 
CISG.  Finally, some U.S. contracting parties may prefer the UCC 
to the CISG not because they view it as substantively superior but 
because they believe that it will give them a “home field” ad-
vantage.44  On this account, a company may use its superior bar-
gaining power to insist upon the application of a particular set of 
national legal rules precisely because these rules are unfamiliar to 
their foreign counterparty.45  In the event that the parties wind up 
in litigation or arbitration, the party who dictated the choice of law 
will, by virtue of its attorneys’ long familiarity with that law, be 
better positioned to prevail or to extract a more favorable settle-
ment. 
Whatever the precise reasons as to why attorneys often rec-
ommend that their clients opt out of the CISG, the survey evidence 
discussed above suggests that this practice is widespread.  There 
are, however, at least two reasons to be cautious about relying too 
extensively upon this survey data. 
First, the sample sizes for many of these surveys are quite 
small.  One published survey of attorney attitudes about the CISG, 
                                                                                                                        
ethical obligations.  See William S. Dodge, Teaching the CISG in Contracts, 50 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 72, 7475 (2000) (discussing a contract dispute where counsel failed 
to timely raise possible winning argument on the applicability of CISG).  One rea-
son why U.S. attorneys may be generally unfamiliar with the CISG is that many 
U.S. law students are not adequately exposed to it as part of their legal training.  
See  John F. Coyle, The Case for Writing International Law into the U.S. Code, 56 B.C. 
L. REV. 433, 46768 (2015) (discussing general lack of exposure to international law 
among American attorneys, judges, and law students). 
41 See SPAGNOLO, supra note 26, at 15564. 
42 See id. at 15864.  
43 See id. at 168; see also id. at 16873. 
44 See id. at 16668. 
45 See id. at 16667.  
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for example, received responses from only twenty-seven attorneys 
in China, thirty-three attorneys in Germany, and fifty attorneys in 
the United States.46  Given the absolute number of attorneys in 
each of these jurisdictions—approximately 200,000, 138,000, and 
1.26 million, respectively—it is not clear that these sample sizes are 
large enough to accurately represent the views of the entire attor-
ney population.  Even the Global Sales Law survey, the most ambi-
tious global survey on this topic to date, elicited responses from 
only eighty-five respondents in the United States. 
Second, all of the above-cited surveys must grapple with meth-
odological issues, including response bias, non-response bias, and 
self-selection bias, that may render survey evidence unreliable.  
There is the possibility that survey respondents will give answers 
that they believe the questioner wants to hear (response bias).47  
There is the possibility that certain types of potential respondents, 
such as attorneys who are generally unfamiliar with the CISG, will 
simply decline to respond to the survey (non-response bias).48  And 
there is the possibility that individuals who are wildly enthusiastic 
about the CISG, or who intensely dislike it, will take the time to 
complete the survey when others do not (self-selection bias).49   
This is not to suggest, of course, that all of the published sur-
veys to date are unreliable.  Nor is it to suggest the surveys them-
selves serve no purpose or provide no useful information.  It is 
merely to point out the potential advantages of seeking to answer 
the same basic question—how often contracting parties choose to 
                                                     
46 Koehler & Yujun, supra note 27, at 4647; see also Michael Wallace Gordon, 
Part II - Some Thoughts on the Receptiveness of Contract Rules in the CISG and 
UNIDROIT Principles as Reflected in One State’s (Florida) Experience of (1) Law School 
Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar with an International Practice, and (3) Judges, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 361, 36264 (1998) (presenting survey data on Florida legal community’s 
experience with CISG without providing the sample size). 
47 See Zev J. Eigen & Yair Listokin, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own Hype 
and Should They?:  A Natural Experiment, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 239, 25051 (2012) (dis-
cussing problem of response bias in surveys).  In the context of the CISG, for ex-
ample, respondents may shy away from reporting that they “always” exclude it 
out of a fear of offending a research team that clearly thinks that the treaty is im-
portant enough to warrant conducting a survey relating to it. 
48 See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Con-
sumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-
1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 15051 (1994) (discussing the problem of non-
response bias in surveys). 
49 See Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Ac-
tion at Boalt Hall, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2241, 227374 (2000) (discussing problem of self-
selection bias in surveys). 
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make use of the CISG when contracting—via a methodological ap-
proach other than surveys of practicing attorneys. 
 
 
3.  USING ACTUAL CONTRACTS TO UNDERSTAND CISG PRACTICE 
 
If the goal is to ascertain the role played by the CISG in con-
temporary contracting practice without resorting to surveys, an al-
ternative approach is to look to the text of actual international sales 
contracts.  Although these contracts are generally not available to 
the public, there is at least one public repository that contains hun-
dreds of thousands of private contracts.  This is the Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (“EDGAR”) maintained 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States.50  
This Part first describes how I went about assembling a dataset of 
contracts that reference the CISG from this database.  It then de-
scribes the advantages and disadvantages to using these contracts, 
as opposed to attorney surveys, to gain insight into CISG contract-
ing practice. 
 
3.1.  Assembling the Dataset 
 
In the United States, companies that sell securities to significant 
numbers of non-professional investors are required by law to regis-
ter with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).51  
Thereafter, these companies are periodically required to file certain 
information about their business and finances with the SEC.  
Among other duties, each reporting company is required to file 
with the SEC any “material contract” to which it is a party.52  This 
                                                     
50 Other scholars have also relied on the EDGAR database to gain insight into 
party practice as it relates to choice of law.  See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geof-
frey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice 
of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 
1488 n.61 (2009); Sarath Sanga, Choice of Law: An Empirical Analysis, 11 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 894, 90203 (2014). 
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012) (requiring companies that have sold securities 
to the public to file “a registration statement . . . with respect to such security con-
taining such information and documents as the Commission may specify”). 
52 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (2016) (listing criteria for determining wheth-
er a contract is “material”); see also Valerie Ford Jacob et al., The New Form 8-K: Fif-
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requirement is significant because it means that the SEC has in its 
possession a massive repository of private contracts that would 
otherwise be kept hidden from public view.53  These contracts are 
accessible online through the EDGAR database. 
I worked with a team of research assistants to comb through 
the EDGAR database in search of contracts that referred to the 
CISG.  In order to identify contracts that reference this treaty, we 
performed a search for the term “international sale of goods” in 
EDGAR Online.54  When we performed a search for this phrase in 
all SEC documents filed between January 1, 1988, and December 
31, 2014, the search generated 6,911 hits.55  In 105 instances, the 
phrase “international sale of goods” was not used to refer to the 
CISG. These documents were excluded from the dataset.  In the 
remaining 6,806 instances in which the phrase was used, it was 
contained in a contract that referred to the CISG.  There were, 
however, a significant number of instances in which the same con-
tract appeared multiple times in the dataset.  After the duplicates 
were removed, there were 5,092 contracts remaining.  This group 
of 5,092 unique contracts constitutes the primary dataset of con-
tracts analyzed in this Article.56  This group includes a wide range 
of contract types and is not comprised exclusively of international 
sales agreements; any contract that referenced the CISG was in-
cluded. 
Once the dataset was created, I again worked with a team of re-
search assistants to review the contracts within it in an attempt to 
answer a number of questions.  Most significantly, we sought to 
discover whether these contracts generally referred to the CISG in 
                                                                                                                        
teen Items Every General Counsel Needs to Know, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 42, 43 
(2006) (discussing disclosure requirement for material amendments to material 
contracts). 
53 The overwhelming majority of private contracts are, of course, kept under 
lock and key by parties who have no reason to make public the details of their 
private business arrangements. 
54 This phrase was chosen because our initial forays into the database re-
vealed that parties referred to the CISG in many different ways.  In almost every 
instance, however, the formulation utilized by the parties contained the phrase 
“international sale of goods.” 
55 The SEC did not mandate that all public companies submit their filings 
through EDGAR until May 6, 1996.  The earliest dated contract that referenced the 
CISG was filed on January 21, 1994. 
56 One recent study found that a total of 705,669 unique material contracts 
were filed with the SEC between 1996 and 2012.  See Sanga, supra note 50, at 903. 
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order to exclude it as a source of governing law or to choose it as a 
source of governing law.  The goal was to obtain a better sense of 
the role that the CISG played in these agreements and to determine 
whether there had been any changes in CISG contract practice over 
time. 
We also coded a subset of these contracts—those in which the 
CISG was affirmatively selected as the governing law—for a num-
ber of other variables, including the nationality of the buyer and 
seller, the industry of the filing company, the type of contract at is-
sue, and the type of goods being sold.  This information made it 
possible to draw more general conclusions about which companies 
were most likely to choose the CISG to govern their contracts.  The 
goal was to determine whether there were any pockets of support 
for the CISG within the United States and elsewhere.  With this 
same end in mind, I also sent letters to all of the U.S. companies 
and many of the foreign companies that had affirmatively chosen 
the CISG to govern their agreements to inquire as to why they had 
made this choice. 
 
3.2.  Benefits and Drawbacks 
 
There are a number of virtues in the methodological approach 
outlined above.  First, the dataset contracts constitute a historical 
record that cannot be changed or misremembered.  In this respect, 
they may be a more reliable indicator of party practice than the 
recollections of attorneys responding to a survey.  Second, it is eas-
ier to review thousands of documents than it is to obtain survey re-
sponses from thousands of people.  A contract-based approach 
thus makes it possible to draw upon a larger sample size while at 
the same time reducing the likelihood that response bias, non-
response bias, or self-selection bias will influence the results.  
Third, these contracts contain a host of other data, such as the in-
dustry and nationality of the buyer and seller to specific agree-
ments, that can provide useful context for the underlying decision 
to select or to exclude the CISG as a source of law.  The availability 
of this contextual data makes it possible to paint a deeper and rich-
er portrait of CISG practice than would be possible through survey 
data alone. 
There are, however, a number of drawbacks to relying upon a 
review of contracts to gain insight into CISG practice.  First and 
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foremost, there is the problem of selection bias.  Every single con-
tract in the EDGAR dataset is a material contract that was filed with 
the SEC by a public company.  In other words, the universe of con-
tracts examined as part of this project consisted exclusively of im-
portant agreements filed by companies that are disproportionately 
larger and wealthier than the typical company.  In addition, public 
companies that enter into high-stakes contracts are more likely to 
be concerned about legal uncertainty than are smaller companies 
entering into low-stakes contracts.  To the extent that national law 
is viewed as providing a more predictable legal framework than 
the CISG, the dataset contracts are likely to contain a greater pro-
portion of opt outs than in the contract population as a whole.  In 
other words, given the limitations on the contracts available, a re-
view of these and only these contracts may not paint an accurate 
portrait of contracting practice in the aggregate.57 
Second, one might argue that there are two purposes for rules 
of uniform international sales law: (1) to provide uniform law to be 
chosen by the parties; and (2) to provide uniform law as default 
rules when no choice is made.  A contract review of the type un-
dertaken in this Article only addresses the first of these purposes.  
It may be that the second purpose, which focuses on litigation ra-
ther than transactional planning, is reason enough by itself to vali-
date the CISG.  The widespread ratification of the CISG has al-
lowed national courts in many countries to avoid difficult choice-
of-law analyses in the context of domestic litigation.  It has also en-
abled national judges to apply the (relatively more familiar) CISG 
in cases in which they would otherwise have had to apply the (rel-
atively less familiar) law of a foreign jurisdiction.  Therefore, to the 
extent this Article is focused primarily on transactional planning as 
manifested in contract drafting, it may fail to fully account for oth-
er benefits that may flow from the widespread ratification of the 
CISG in situations involving oral contracts or written contracts that 
lack a choice-of-law provision.58 
                                                     
57 The critique that these contracts are not representative, however, cuts both 
ways.  The contracts in the dataset were negotiated and drafted by individuals 
representing public companies.  These companies can generally afford to hire 
high-quality legal counsel—the elite members of the U.S. bar—to specifically ad-
vise them on these agreements.  If these elite attorneys regularly counsel their cli-
ents to opt out of the CISG, then this is a significant finding. 
58 See United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, UNCITAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html 
[https://perma.cc/EYE3-QUHB] (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (“Small and medium-
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Third, every contract in the primary dataset references the 
CISG in some way.  Some reference the CISG to exclude it.  Others 
reference the CISG in order to choose it.  In both cases, the contract 
mentions the CISG by name.  There are, by contrast, no contracts in 
the primary dataset that do not reference the CISG at all.  This is 
potentially a problem because the CISG will apply to govern inter-
national sales contracts when the parties fail to mention it in at 
least two specific instances: (1) where the parties fail altogether to 
address the issue of choice of law; and (2) where the parties select 
the law of a particular U.S. state but do not reference the CISG. 
In the first instance, where the parties fail to make any mention 
of governing law, the CISG will apply as a default rule so long as 
the contract is for the sale of goods, the parties’ places of business 
are in different nations, and the nations in question have both rati-
fied the CISG.59  In cases such as these, it is difficult to know what 
the parties were thinking.  On the one hand, it is possible that they 
knew the CISG would apply as a default rule and felt that there 
was no need to include a choice-of-law clause in the agreement.  
On the other hand, it is possible that the parties were entirely una-
ware of the CISG’s potential applicability and assumed that the 
contract would be governed by national sales law.  Since the only 
contracts selected for inclusion in the primary dataset are those 
that specifically reference the CISG, this dataset will have little to 
tell us about the preferences of those parties whose contracts failed 
altogether to address the question of choice of law.60 
In the second instance, where the parties choose to have their 
contract governed by the law of a particular U.S. state but make no 
reference to the CISG, the CISG will also supply the governing law.  
                                                                                                                        
sized enterprises as well as traders located in developing countries typically have 
reduced access to legal advice when negotiating a contract.  Thus, they are more 
vulnerable to problems caused by inadequate treatment in the contract of issues 
relating to applicable law.  The same enterprises and traders may also be the 
weaker contractual parties and could have difficulties in ensuring that the con-
tractual balance is kept.  Those merchants would therefore derive particular bene-
fit from the default application of the fair and uniform regime of the CISG to con-
tracts falling under its scope.”); David P. Stewart, Private International Law, the Rule 
of Law, and Economic Development, 56 VILL. L. REV. 607, 61011 (2011) (“In an in-
creasingly interconnected world, the harmonization and codification functions of 
private international law assume ever-greater practical importance in promoting 
trade, commerce, and economic development.”). 
59 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
60 A prior study found that approximately 89% of contracts on file in the 
EDGAR database contain choice-of-law clauses.  Sanga, supra note 50, at 903. 
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At first glance, this may seem surprising.  It is not obvious that a 
choice-of-law clause selecting the law of New York would result in 
the application of the CISG.  Most U.S. courts have reasoned, how-
ever, that New York law necessarily includes all forms of federal 
law and that the CISG—as a properly ratified federal treaty—is 
therefore a part of the law of New York.61  This interpretive rule 
necessarily presents a challenge to any attempt to gain insight into 
CISG contracting practice.  On the one hand, parties may choose 
the law of New York to govern their contracts in full knowledge 
that this choice will result in the application of the CISG.  On the 
other hand, parties may choose the law of New York without real-
izing that this choice amounts to an indirect selection of CISG.62  If 
the parties truly want the CISG to govern their contract, then one 
would think that they would say as much by naming it in their 
agreement.  There is, however, no requirement that they do so.  
This issue is addressed in Part 6. 
 
 
                                                     
61 See Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. SaintGobain Tech. Fabrics Can. 
Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d at 108182.  The practical effect of this line of cases is that 
even a choice-of-law clause expressly selecting “the laws of New York” or “the 
laws of California” that makes no reference to the CISG will generally result in the 
application of the CISG.  See William P. Johnson, Understanding Exclusion of the 
CISG: A New Paradigm of Determining Party Intent, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 213, 24859 
(2011) (discussing U.S. case law on choice-of-law analysis when CISG is not ex-
cluded).  By contrast, where the parties state that their contract is to be governed 
by the “New York Uniform Commercial Code,” then this formulation will typical-
ly be read to have excluded the CISG because it is logically impossible for both the 
CISG and the New York UCC to govern the same agreement. 
62 While there is some scattered evidence that the latter scenario is the more 
common one, there is no way to know for certain what the parties intend when 
they select national sales law as the law to govern their contract.  See Asante Tech., 
Inc. v. PMCSierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see also Ma-
thias Reimann, The CISG in the United States: Why It Has Been Neglected and Why 
Europeans Should Care, 71 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND 
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABEL J. COMP. INT’L PRIV. L.] 115, 12023 (2007) 
(considering “fundamental ignorance,” “illicit avoidance,” and “conscious exclu-
sion” as reasons for lack of CISG litigation in U.S. courts); Coyle, supra note 19, at 
37083 (discussing studies and data concerning the CISG and challenging the as-
sertion that national actors perceive the CISG to be superior to national commer-
cial law). 
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4.  SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT U.S. CONTRACT PRACTICE AS IT 
RELATES TO THE CISG 
 
A comprehensive review of the contracts in the primary dataset 
supports a number of general observations about the nature of U.S. 
contract practice as it relates to the CISG.  Significantly, the picture 
that emerges from this review paints a very different and more 
pessimistic picture of U.S. practice than the one painted by the ex-
isting survey evidence.  These contracts suggest that: (1) U.S. com-
panies routinely exclude the CISG from contracts to which it 
would not otherwise apply; (2) the number of U.S. companies that 
select the CISG to govern their contracts is small and declining; (3) 
the CISG lacks broad support within any industry or geographic 
region within the United States; and (4) some companies that had 
selected the CISG in the past now have a policy of excluding it 
from their contracts. 
 
4.1.  U.S. Companies Routinely Exclude the CISG from Contracts to 
Which It Would Never Apply 
 
The CISG, by its terms, applies exclusively to contracts for the 
sale of goods where the contracting parties have their places of 
business in different countries and both of the countries in question 
have ratified the CISG.63  It follows, therefore, that there is no need 
for the parties to exclude the CISG when: (1) the contract does not 
involve the sale of goods; (2) the parties have their places of busi-
                                                     
63 The CISG states that it may supply the governing law where only one con-
tracting party has its place of business in a country that has ratified the CISG and 
“the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of [the rat-
ifying nation].”  CISG art. 1(1)(b).  However, Article 95 of the CISG allows a nation 
to make a reservation at the time that it ratifies the CISG, stating that it will not be 
bound by Article 1(1)(b).  See CISG art. 95.  The United States has made an Article 
95 declaration.  See Impuls I.D. Internacional, S.L. v. PsionTeklogix Inc., 234 F. 
Supp. 2d 1267, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“The United States specifically rejected being 
bound by subparagraph (1)(b).”).  Consequently, the CISG will only apply to con-
tracts involving U.S. parties when the foreign counterparty has its place of busi-
ness in a country that has also ratified the CISG.  Cf. Prime Start Ltd. v. Maher 
Forest Prods. Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (“Because not all 
parties are from countries that signed the CISG, the CISG cannot apply to this 
dispute, even if a traditional choice-of-law analysis leads to the application of the 
law of the United States (or one of its states) or any other signatory State.  Accord-
ingly, some body of law other than the CISG will govern this dispute.”). 
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ness in the same country; or (3) one of the parties hails from a 
country that has not ratified the CISG.  A review of the U.S. con-
tracts in the dataset, however, suggests that companies routinely 
exclude the CISG from contracts in each of these situations. 
First, it is common for U.S. companies to exclude the CISG 
from wholly domestic contracts.  A biodiesel purchase agreement 
between a Tennessee buyer and an Iowa seller.64  A distribution 
agreement between a New Mexico seller and a Michigan buyer.65  
A manufacturing and supply agreement between a Pennsylvania 
manufacturer and a California buyer.66  A patent license agreement 
between two California companies.67  In each of these contracts, the 
parties excluded the CISG.  In each case, however, the exclusion 
was unnecessary because the CISG only applies where the parties 
have their places of business in different countries.   
Second, there are a number of dataset contracts where the CISG 
is excluded from a contract involving a foreign counterparty whose 
home country has not ratified the CISG.  A manufacturing and 
supply agreement between a California company and an Irish 
company.68  A distribution agreement between a California com-
pany and an English company.69  A manufacturing and supply 
agreement between a North Carolina company and an Indian 
                                                     
64 E.g., Pilot Travel Centers LLC, Biodiesel Purchase Agreement with REG 
Mktg. and Logistics Grp. (Form 10-Q) Exhibit 10.1 (May 9, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1463258/000144530514002070/regi-
2014q1xex101.htm [https://perma.cc/4XGL-LE58]. 
65 E.g., Enerpulse Techs., Inc., Distribution Agreement with Green Bridge 
Technologies LLC (Form 8-K) Exhibit 10.1 (Nov. 7, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1495899/000114420414065901/v393
592_ex10-1.htm [https://perma.cc/HY9N-YD5W].  
66 E.g., Relypsa, Inc., Manufacturing and Supply Agreement Between Lanxess 
Corporation and Relypsa, Inc. (Form 10-K) Exhibit 10.6 (Mar. 19, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416792/000119312514104575/d678
553dex106.htm [https://perma.cc/ZA84-VD3L]. 
67 E.g., Landmark Infrastructure Partners LP, Patent License Agreement with 
American Infrastructure Funds, LLC (Form S-11/A) Exhibit 10.7 (Oct. 30, 2014) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1615346/000104746914008674/
a2221760zex-10_7.htm [https://perma.cc/J27N-3S9E].  
68 E.g., Zogenix, Inc., Manufacturing and Supply Agreement with Endo Ven-
tures Limited (Form 10-Q) Exhibit 10.2 (Aug. 6, 2014) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1375151/000137515114000006/ex10
2-2014630.htm [https://perma.cc/V8ME-TVTW].  
69 E.g., Therapeutic Sols. Int’l, Inc., Distribution Agreement with S4S (UK) 
Limited (Form 8-K) Exhibit 10.1 (June 18, 2013) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1419051/000107878213001228/f8k0
61713_ex10z1.htm [https://perma.cc/HDE7-7648]. 
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company.70  A supply agreement between an Ohio company and a 
Taiwanese company.71  In each case, again, the contract in question 
excluded the CISG.  In each case, again, these exclusions were un-
necessary because the CISG only applies where each of the parties 
has its principal place of business in a country that has ratified the 
CISG and, to date, neither Ireland nor England nor India nor Tai-
wan has done so.72 
Third, and finally, there are hundreds of dataset contracts in 
which the parties opted out of the CISG even though the contract 
in question did not involve the sale of goods.73  A share purchase 
agreement.74  A registration rights and stockholder agreement.75  A 
master services agreement.76  An aircraft purchase agreement.77  It 
is unnecessary to exclude the CISG from these contracts because 
none of them involve the sale of “goods” as that term is defined by 
the CISG.  The dataset is, however, replete with such agreements in 
which the CISG is excluded.  
 
                                                     
70 E.g., Cempra Pharm., Inc., API Manufacturing and Supply Agreement with 
Wockhardt Ltd. (Form 10-K) Exhibit 10.11 (Mar. 7, 2013 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1461993/000119312513096011/d445
006dex1011.htm [https://perma.cc/TL2R-TQJR]. 
71 E.g., PECO II, Inc., Supply Agreement with Delta Electronics, Inc. (Form 8-
K) Exhibit 10.1 (May 22, 2009) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/845072/000111650209000863/peco1
01.htm [https://perma.cc/M3X8-4LWU].  
72 See UNCITRAL, Status on CISG, supra note 5 (listing nations that have rati-
fied the CISG and making no mention of England, Ireland, India, or Taiwan).  
Hong Kong was coded as being a party to the CISG notwithstanding disagree-
ment on this issue among U.S. courts.  See infra note 84 (discussing U.S. case law 
relating to the status of Hong Kong under the CISG). 
73 See CISG art. 2(d) (stating that the CISG shall not apply to contracts for the 
sale of “stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments or money”). 
74 E.g., Sumitomo Heavy Indus. & Axcelis Techs., Inc., Share Purchase 
Agreement with Sen Corporation, An Shi and Axcelis Co. (Form 8-K) Exhibit 10.1 
(Feb. 27, 2009) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1113232/
000110465909012845/a09-6240_1ex10d1.htm [https://perma.cc/5RAF-228Y].   
75 E.g., Spectrum Pharm., Inc., Registration Rights and Stockholder Agree-
ment with TopoTarget A/S (Form 10-K) Exhibit 4.2 (Mar. 12, 2014) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831547/000119312514094593/
d640093dex42.htm [https://perma.cc/9C6T-6HFM].  
76 E.g., State St. Bank & Tr. Co., Master Services Agreement with Each BTC 
Recipient Listed in Exhibit A, Exhibit 10.5 (July 1, 2013) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1535365/000119312513277818/d482
189dex105.htm [https://perma.cc/3ACV-9BZZ]. 
77 See generally CISG art. 2(e) (stating that the CISG is not applicable to con-
tracts for the sale of aircraft). 
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 Collectively, the proportion of U.S. contracts in the dataset in 
which the CISG was unnecessarily excluded is significant, as illus-
trated by Table 1 below.78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, approximately 69% of U.S. dataset contracts filed with the 
SEC between 2009 and 2014 that opted out of the CISG did so 
needlessly.  It is, of course, common for attorneys to simply cut and 
paste language from one contract into another without considering 
whether that language is strictly necessary.79  And there is certainly 
                                                     
78 Table 1 was assembled in the following manner:  First, I screened for U.S. 
contracts in the primary dataset that were wholly domestic.  Once these contracts 
were identified and coded, they were set aside.  Second, I screened the remaining 
contracts for agreements in which the counterparty’s home country had not rati-
fied the CISG.  Once these contracts were identified and coded, they were also set 
aside.  Finally, I screened those contracts that remained for agreements that were 
not for the sale of goods.  The virtue of this approach was that no contract was 
counted more than once.  The vice of this approach is that it resulted in the under-
counting of contracts that were not for the sale of goods.  Non-sales contracts be-
tween (1) two U.S. parties, and (2) a U.S. party and foreign counterparty whose 
home country has not ratified by the CISG, are not separately identified in Table 1.  
79 See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE 
TRANSACTION:  BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 9394 (John M. 
Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2013) (discussing the reasons for the practice of copy-
ing clauses in existing contracts and inserting them into new contracts without 
considering costs or benefits to client); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Stand-
ardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 
83 VA. L. REV. 713, 72324 (1997) (discussing potential benefits of using boiler-
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no harm in excluding the CISG from contracts to which it would 
not otherwise apply.  At the same time, the fact that just over two-
thirds of these contracts opted out of the CISG when there was no 
need to do so suggests that the default position is to exclude the 
treaty from any and all contracts.  This pattern of practice indicates 
that many U.S. companies reflexively exclude the CISG without 
inquiring as to whether it would apply of its own force. 
 
4.2.  The Number of U.S. Contracts That Affirmatively Choose the 
CISG is Tiny 
 
When a dataset contract references the CISG, it invariably does 
so either to exclude it or to choose it as the governing law.  In 99% of 
the primary dataset contracts—5,028 out of 5,092—the parties refer 
to the CISG in order to exclude it.  In just 1% of these agreements—
61 contracts out of 5,092—the parties refer to the CISG to state that 
they want it to govern the agreement.80  The number of contracts 
that affirmatively choose the CISG, moreover, appears to be on the 
decline.  There were actually fewer contracts in which U.S. compa-
nies affirmatively chose the CISG as their governing law in 2014 
                                                                                                                        
plate). 
80 Technically, the survey disclosed exactly sixty-four contracts in which the 
CISG was affirmatively chosen as the governing law, but in three cases the choice 
was nonsensical or obviously done in error.  See Auspex Sys., Inc., Auspex Sys-
tems, Inc. or Subsidiary Corporation (Herein “Auspex”) Authorized Reseller 
Agreement between Auspex Systems, Inc., and Net Brains, Inc. (Form 10-Q, Ex-
hibit 10.1, ¶ 21) (Nov. 6, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/860749/000089161801501949/f76765ex10-1.txt [https://perma.cc/BA6E-
V62R] (calling for disputes to be submitted to “either the American Arbitration 
Board or the United Nations (UN) Convention on contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG)”); Interactive Telesis, Inc., Agreement for Services with 
AT&T Corporation (Exhibit 10) (Apr. 21, 2000) (stating that agreement shall be 
governed by both the CISG and the Uniform Commercial Code); Vantage Health, 
Inc., Director Retainer Agreement with William S. Rees, Jr. (Form 8-K, Exhibit 
10.2) (Dec. 19, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1497130/000149315213002742/ex10
-2.htm [https://perma.cc/4BU4-SQK8] (selecting CISG to govern a contract be-
tween a U.S. company and a U.S. director whose purpose was to compensate a 
director for his service on a corporate board).  Within this subset of sixty-one con-
tracts, nineteen were concluded between two foreign companies.  This leaves ex-
actly forty-two contracts out of a total dataset of 5,092 in which a U.S. company 
entered into a contract where the CISG was expressly chosen as the governing 
law. 
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than there were in 1995, as illustrated by Table 2.81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
These findings are difficult to reconcile with claims advanced 
by some scholars that the CISG is gaining traction in the United 
States.82  If the CISG were truly making inroads in the U.S. legal 
community, one would expect to see a gradual increase in the 
number of U.S. contracts in which it was affirmatively chosen as 
the governing law.  The goal of any contract is, after all, to clearly 
express the intent of the parties.  If the parties want the CISG to 
                                                     
81 This Table omits the nineteen contracts from the dataset that were exclu-
sively between foreign parties, which are discussed in Part 5.  Consequently, there 
are forty-two contracts represented in Table 2.  The 1998 spike of opt ins is at-
tributable to a single Massachusetts company that entered into six separate con-
tracts that chose the CISG in that year.  That same company entered into two ad-
ditional contracts that chose the CISG in 1996, which means that eight of the forty-
two contracts listed in Table 2 were negotiated by a single company. 
82 See SPAGNOLO, supra note 26, at 167 (“Arguably, the studies of US lawyers . 
. . demonstrate a trend towards exclusions slowly decreasing.”); Harry M. Flecht-
ner, Changing the Opt-Out Tradition in the United States 34 (Univ. of Pittsburgh 
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2010-10, 
2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571281 [https://perma.cc/2QPD-FAUD] (sug-
gesting that market forces are “altering the traditional practice of U.S. lawyers to 
advise their clients to opt out of the Convention in favor of the application U.S. 
domestic sales law”); see also supra notes 1112 and accompanying text. 
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provide the governing law, it is not unreasonable to think that they 
would occasionally say as much in their agreement.  In cases where 
one of the parties has more than one place of business, for example, 
and where one of these places of business is located in a nation that 
has not ratified the CISG, the parties may want to affirmatively se-
lect the CISG to make clear that they want it to govern the agree-
ment.83  Alternatively, if it is unclear as to whether the counterpar-
ty’s home country is a party to the CISG—as is currently the case 
with Hong Kong—the parties may wish to select the CISG in order 
to remove all doubts as to their intent.84  Parties entering into a dis-
tribution agreement may also want to affirmatively select the CISG 
as the governing law—if this is in fact their intent—because most 
courts have held that the treaty does not apply to distribution 
agreements.85  Similarly, parties negotiating the rights to software 
                                                     
83 See CISG art. 1(2) (“The fact that the parties have their places of business in 
different States is to be disregarded whenever this fact does not appear either 
from the contract or from any dealings between, or from information disclosed by, 
the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract.”); id. art. 10(a) 
(“If a party has more than one place of business, the place of business is that 
which has the closest relationship to the contract and its performance, having re-
gard to the circumstances known to or contemplated by the parties at any time 
before or at the conclusion of the contract . . . .”). 
84 Compare Am.'s Collectibles Network, Inc. v. Timlly (HK), 746 F. Supp. 2d 
914, 920 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) and Innotex Precision Ltd. v. Horei Image Prods., Inc., 
679 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 135859 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (concluding that Hong Kong is not a 
party to CISG), with Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 
4:09CV00318 SWW, 2009 WL 5181854, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009), and CNA 
Int'l Inc. v. Guangdon Kelon Electronical Holdings, No. 05 C 5734, 2008 WL 
8901360, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2008) (concluding that Hong Kong is a party to 
CISG). 
85 See, e.g., Amco Ukrservice v. Am. Meter Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 681, 687 (E.D. 
Pa. 2004) (holding CISG does not apply to distribution agreements); see also 
DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS:  PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 182 (3d ed. 2015) (“[T]he general 
position of the courts [is] that the CISG does not apply to distribution agreements 
. . . .”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); JAMES M. KLOTZ, INTERNATIONAL 
SALES AGREEMENTS: AN ANNOTATED DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING GUIDE 8 (2d ed. 
2008) (“[A] distribution agreement has been held not to be a contract for the sale of 
goods, but rather to be a framework agreement that will govern future sales of 
goods.  Thus, the CISG is not intended to apply to distribution agreements, and 
most courts considering the issue have come to this conclusion.”).  This conclu-
sion runs contrary to the prevailing view among U.S. courts that Article 2 of the 
UCC does apply to distribution agreements notwithstanding the fact that these 
agreements can and often do address matters unrelated to sales.  See Gruppo Es-
senziero Italiano, S.P.A. v. Aromi D’Italia, Inc., No. CCB0865, 2011 WL 3207555, 
at *3 (D. Md. July 27, 2011) (“Although distributorship agreements are considered 
contracts for the sale of goods under Maryland’s Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”), courts have held that such agreements are not considered contracts for 
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licenses may want to name the CISG as the governing law due to 
any lingering uncertainty as to whether software is a “good” to 
which CISG would apply automatically.86  The consistent failure on 
the part of contracting parties to select the CISG as the governing 
law in any of these situations over the past two decades tends to 
undercut the argument that the CISG is becoming a more im-
portant part of contracting practice in the United States.   
 
4.3.  There Is No Clear Locus of Support for the CISG in the United 
States 
 
A review of the dataset contracts offers no evidence suggesting 
that the CISG has been embraced (1) in specific industries, (2) with 
respect to specific products, or (3) in specific geographic areas 
within the United States.87  While those U.S. companies that have 
                                                                                                                        
the sale of goods under the CISG.”); Gary L. Monserud, The Privileges of Suretyship 
for Delegating Parties Under UCC Section 2-210 in Light of the New Restatement of 
Suretyship, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1307, 1394 (1996) (alternation in original) (“Dis-
tribution agreements, which, by their inherent nature, are relational rather than 
transactional contracts, are one such area being subjected to [UCC Article 2’s] 
dominion.”).  Accordingly, if parties wanted the CISG to apply to their interna-
tional distribution agreements, they would be well advised to say as much in their 
contract. 
86 See Douglas A. Hass, A Gentlemen’s Agreement: Assessing the GNU General 
Public License and its Adaptation to Linux, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 213, 22324 
(2007) (discussing whether the CISG applies to software licenses).  On the one 
hand, software is by its nature intangible and hence dissimilar from most other 
“goods.”  On the other hand, software is often bought and sold on disks and other 
tangible objects, which suggests that it may be a “good” within the meaning of the 
CISG.  A further complicating factor is whether the grant of a software license, 
which is essentially a right to use the intellectual property of another, should be 
categorized as a contract of sale.  See Sarah Green & Djakhongir Saidov, Software as 
Goods, J. BUS. L. 161, 175 (2007) (discussing the rights of a purchase of software).  In 
the United States, the question of whether software is a “good” within the mean-
ing of Article 2 of the UCC has generally been answered in the affirmative.  See, 
e.g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding 
software is a good under Article 2 of the UCC).  Many—though not all—of the na-
tional judges called upon to answer the same question with respect to the CISG 
have reached the same conclusion.  See Hass, supra, at 22425 (discussing German 
and Swiss cases holding that CISG applies to contracts for the sale of software).  
To remove all doubt as to their intentions, therefore, parties to international soft-
ware agreements would be well advised to select the CISG if that is, in fact, what 
they want. 
87 The CISG was affirmatively chosen to govern exactly sixty-one contracts in 
the dataset.  Of these, there were forty-two opt-in agreements involving at least 
one U.S. party.  The data presented below is derived from these forty-two con-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
  
224 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
chosen the CISG to govern their contracts do share a number of 
common features, as discussed below, the pattern that emerges 
from these opt-in contracts is one of idiosyncratic and somewhat 
haphazard decisions at the company level rather than one of com-
panies rallying around a common standard. 
First, with respect to industry, the overwhelming majority of 
U.S. companies whose contracts affirmatively selected the CISG 
were located in the manufacturing sector.88  The largest subgroup 
within this sector was comprised of semiconductor companies.89  
The second largest subgroup was comprised of pharmaceutical 
companies.90  To the extent that the CISG enjoys any pockets of 
support within the United States, therefore, the data suggest that 
these pockets of support may lie in the semiconductor industry, on 
the one hand, and in the pharmaceutical industry, on the other. 
Second, with respect to product, the most common item bought 
and sold in these agreements was electronics equipment, including 
semiconductors and their component parts.91  The second most 
common product was computer software, followed by medical 
equipment, industrial equipment, and pharmaceuticals.92 
Finally, with respect to geographic location, a significant num-
ber of U.S. sellers that chose the CISG were located in California.93  
                                                                                                                        
tracts. 
88 A total of thirty-four firms—out of forty-two—were based in the manufac-
turing sector based on their Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) code.  All 
companies registered with the SEC are assigned a number in accordance with the 
SIC system.  See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Rise of the Financial Advi-
sors:  An Empirical Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies, 82 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 141, 155 n.43 (2008) (discussing federal government’s use of SIC 
classifications). 
89 Of the thirty-four firms in the manufacturing sector, thirteen of them pro-
duced electronics. 
90 Of the thirty-four firms in the manufacturing sector, five of them produced 
pharmaceuticals. 
91 Of the forty-two contracts reviewed, a total of nine were for the sale of 
semiconductors.  
92 There were eight contracts for the sale of computer software, seven con-
tracts for the sale of medical equipment, and five contracts for the sale of industri-
al equipment. 
93 There were thirty-two contracts out of the forty-two surveyed in which the 
seller had its principal place of business in the United States.  The sellers in fifteen 
of these contracts were based in California (48%).  The sellers in nine of these con-
tracts were based in Massachusetts (29%).  There were, however, thirteen unique 
U.S. sellers based in California as compared to only two unique U.S. sellers based 
in Massachusetts; one Massachusetts seller entered into eight separate agreements 
in which the CISG was chosen as the governing law.  In terms of broad-based 
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Indeed, there were almost as many California-based sellers as there 
were sellers in all other U.S. states combined.94  The foreign buyers 
in these contracts tended to be located in Europe, North America, 
China, or Japan.95  With respect to U.S. buyers transacting with for-
eign sellers, there was no evidence of geographic clustering—the 
buyers were scattered across the United States.  The foreign sellers 
in these contracts, however, tended to be based in Europe. 
The prototypical U.S. firm that affirmatively selects the CISG, 
therefore, is a California-based manufacturing company that sells 
semiconductors to counterparties based in Europe, North America, 
or the Far East.  There are, however, relatively few contracts that 
match this prototype exactly.  Those contracts that do conform to 
the prototype, moreover, tend to be older agreements negotiated 
prior to 2003.  Nevertheless, there were enough hints scattered 
through the contracts dataset that California-based semiconductor 
companies may be favorably disposed to the CISG to warrant fur-
ther inquiry.  To this end, I contacted a number of California based 
attorneys who represent semiconductor companies to ask them if 
these companies did, in fact, utilize the CISG with any regularity. 
The answer was a clear and unequivocal no.  One attorney with 
fifteen years of practice experience in this area stated that “we gen-
erally exclude [the CISG] where we think it’s applicable” and that 
“this is the approach I generally see with companies where the 
lawyers are aware of the issue.”96  A different attorney who works 
in-house at a well-known semiconductor manufacturer observed 
                                                                                                                        
support that spans multiple different companies, therefore, the CISG would seem 
to enjoy more support among sellers in California than in Massachusetts. 
94 In eight contracts, both the buyer and seller were based in the United 
States.  In some cases, the decision to select the CISG as the governing law be-
tween two U.S. entities may be explained by the context.  In one contract, for ex-
ample, the U.S. seller had previously purchased goods from an Italian seller and 
was looking to immediately resell these same goods to a U.S. buyer.  See Pow-
ersource Corp., Distribution Agreement between Econowatt Corporation and 
Greenview Energy Inc. (Form 10-QSB, Exhibit 4.1, 2) (Nov. 30, 2001).  In another, 
the U.S. seller was a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign corporation and it ap-
pears that the true selling entity was the foreign corporation.  Emy’s Salsa Aji Dis-
trib. Co., Distributor Agreement with Orbital Group, LLC (Form SB-2, Exhibit 
10.1) (Nov. 13, 2007).  In other cases, however, it is not clear why the parties chose 
the CISG to govern their wholly domestic sales agreement. 
95 There were eleven North American counterparties (including U.S. buyers), 
ten European counterparties, four Japanese counterparties, and three counterpar-
ties based in China or Hong Kong. 
96 E-mail from Partner, Silicon Valley Law Firm, to author (Dec. 19, 2014) (on 
file with author). 
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that his company has long excluded the CISG from its international 
contracts as a matter of policy.97  He cited “inconsistency” as to 
when the CISG will apply and the fact that the “CISG generally 
disfavors sellers” as reasons for this policy.98  Still another attorney 
with more than twenty years of practice experience representing 
semiconductor companies observed that “everyone is spooked by 
the CISG” and that he had never seen a contract, or been part of a 
negotiation, in which a U.S. semiconductor company proposed that 
the CISG be selected as the governing law.99  The general practice, 
he explained, was to exclude the CISG and try to have the contract 
governed by the law of California or New York.  As a fallback, he 
said, companies would agree to have their contracts governed by 
the law of Hong Kong or Singapore.100  
Each of the attorneys interviewed was adamant that the CISG, 
far from being embraced by California-based semiconductor com-
panies, is actually strongly disfavored.  A review of the remaining 
opt-in contracts, moreover, failed to uncover any other industries, 
products, or geographic locations within the United States in 
which the CISG appears to have gained traction. 
 
4.4.  Some Companies That Have Previously Opted In to the CISG 
Now Opt Out 
 
While the CISG may lack widespread support, it was affirma-
tively selected in forty-two dataset contracts involving U.S. com-
panies.101  In order to discover why the treaty had been embraced 
by these companies, I sent letters to all of the U.S. companies that 
were parties to these agreements, and to many of the foreign ones 
as well, to ask why they had selected the CISG.  Many of the letters 
were returned to me as undeliverable.  This was disappointing, but 
not altogether surprising given that most of the contracts in ques-
tion were executed prior to 2003.  Many of the companies in ques-
                                                     
97 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Semiconductor Company, to author 
(Feb. 20, 2015) (on file with author). 
98 Id. 
99 Telephone Interview with Partner, Silicon Valley Law Firm (Mar. 20, 2015). 
100 He explained that these jurisdictions are generally perceived to be rough 
U.S. equivalents when it came to the structure and content of their law because of 
their historical connections with English law.  Id. 
101 It was also selected in nineteen contracts between two foreign companies.  
These nineteen contracts are discussed at greater length in Part 5. 
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tion had gone out of business or been acquired in the intervening 
years.  Ultimately, I received ten replies to my letters and follow-
up e-mails.  In three cases, the company replied to inform me that 
that no information would be forthcoming in response to my in-
quiry.  In seven cases, I was personally contacted by a company 
representative via telephone or e-mail.102  These seven responses, 
which are discussed at some length below, offer invaluable insight 
into the process of corporate decision making with respect to 
choice-of-law determinations as they relate to the CISG. 
The most striking finding was that all seven of the company 
representatives who contacted me reported that their company’s 
general policy was to exclude the CISG.  These responses were re-
markable because each of these companies was contacted specifical-
ly because it had previously selected the CISG as the governing law in a 
particular agreement.  Indeed, the entire point of contacting these 
companies was to try to figure out how and why they had em-
braced the CISG.  If ever there were a group of U.S. companies that 
was likely to contain at least one CISG enthusiast, this would have 
been that group.  In each instance, however, the company repre-
sentative stated that the company typically excluded the CISG 
from its international contracts as a matter of policy. 
The company representatives offered a wide range of explana-
tions as to why, precisely, their general policy was to exclude the 
CISG.  One representative observed that his company typically ex-
cluded the CISG because he and the other lawyers there were all 
trained in the UCC—and hence more familiar with it—and because 
there were more cases in which courts in the United States have 
applied the UCC.103  A different representative noted that his com-
pany excluded the CISG from its contracts on the advice of an out-
side counsel who was generally more familiar with California law.  
Still another representative stated that her company excluded the 
CISG in its supply contracts because it preferred for its contracts to 
be governed by national sales law whenever possible.104 
                                                     
102 It should be emphasized that the qualitative data outlined below are sub-
ject to many of the same biases that infect all surveys to one degree or another.  
See supra notes 4749 and accompanying text (discussing survey bias).  These bi-
ases are, however, somewhat less salient in this context because the information 
derived from company interviews is being used to confirm conclusions generated 
through a review of existing contracts.  
103 Telephone Interview with Associate General Counsel, U.S. Company (Jan. 
8, 2015).  
104 E-mail from Legal Counsel, Swiss Pharmaceutical Company, to author 
(Jan. 7, 2015) (on file with author). 
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In two instances, the company representative was able to pro-
vide a more-or-less complete account of the process that led to the 
CISG being chosen with respect to a particular agreement.  In each 
instance, the choice of the CISG was attributable to the presence of 
special circumstances unlikely to arise in the ordinary course of 
business.  In the first case, the CISG was chosen because the parent 
companies negotiating the contract were based in Mexico and 
Hong Kong and the goods in question were to be transported from 
Canada to Mexico via the United States before the buyer took de-
livery.  Under these unusual circumstances, the representative ex-
plained, it made sense for the contract to be governed by a body of 
law that was the same in all of the relevant jurisdictions.  
In the second case, the company representative explained that 
historical vagaries had led to a long tradition of commercial con-
tracts with Russian (and, before that, Soviet) entities being gov-
erned by Swedish law.105  In the contract at issue, where the parties 
were having difficulty reaching agreement on governing law, the 
U.S. buyer had proposed that the parties draft their contract to 
state that it would be governed by both the law of Sweden and the 
CISG.  The goal in this case, in other words, was to move away 
from a body of law with which its attorneys were largely unfamil-
iar (Swedish law) and towards a body of law with which its attor-
neys were marginally more familiar (the CISG).  This goal was real-
ized when the Russian counterparty agreed to the proposal.  
When the respondents outlined their basic hierarchy of prefer-
ences when it came to the governing law, virtually all of them ex-
pressed a clear preference for national law as an alternative to the 
CISG.  Their stated first preference was for the national sales law of 
their “home” country.  A second-best outcome was for the contract 
to be governed by the national sales law of a “neutral” third coun-
try.  The list of such countries whose law would be potentially ac-
ceptable included Canada, Delaware, England, France, Hong 
Kong, New York, Singapore and Switzerland.106  Many of the re-
                                                     
105 Telephone Interview with Associate General Counsel, U.S. Company (Jan. 
8, 2015). 
106 This same hierarchy of preferences was expressed by a different attor-
ney—who works in-house at a major U.S. semiconductor manufacturer—whose 
employer did not have any contracts in the dataset.  He stated that his company 
generally prefers to have its contracts governed by the law of Delaware, New 
York, or Oregon.  If a foreign counterparty is reluctant to have an agreement gov-
erned by U.S. law, however, the company will sometimes agree to have its con-
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spondents reported that if it came down to a choice between the 
national sales law of a third country with no connection to the 
transaction or the CISG, they would prefer the national sales law of 
the third country.  Again, this result was surprising because each 
of the companies in question was contacted precisely because it 
had affirmatively chosen the CISG as the governing law in the past. 
In one instance, I received responses from companies that were 
on opposite sides in a particular contract negotiation.  The former 
president of a U.S. pharmaceutical company e-mailed me to state 
that he could not recall why the CISG was chosen to govern a con-
tract between his Texas based company and a Swiss counterparty 
in 2009.107  The Swiss counterparty also contacted me to report that 
the company generally excluded the CISG from its international 
agreements and that she could only “assume that the choice-of-law 
provision in this particular contract was amended in the negotia-
tions with [the U.S. counterparty].”108  In this particular case, there-
fore, neither contracting party was able to provide an explanation 
as to why the CISG was selected as the governing law in their con-
tract. 
Finally, the president of a Virginia-based information technolo-
gy company reported that his company has been engaged in vari-
ous international transactions over the years.  When asked about 
the role that the CISG played in a reseller agreement from 2006, he 
explained that the company used the “UN funding” for “world 
court” purposes but that it switched to the Uniform Commercial 
Code for purely domestic agreements.109  He then remarked upon 
the importance of venue, stating that “if it’s the UN transactions, 
then you’re at the world court in New York” and that you “can’t 
choose to have international transactions governed by the North 
Carolina Supreme Court.”110  This particular response indicates that 
the CISG remains a largely unknown quantity in some quarters 
                                                                                                                        
tracts governed by the law of England, Wales, Hong Kong, or Singapore.  E-mail 
from In-House Counsel, U.S. Semiconductor Company, to author (Feb. 20, 2015) 
(on file with author).  This attorney also noted that his company excluded the 
CISG from its contracts as a matter of policy.  Id. 
107 E-mail from former President, U.S. Pharmaceutical Company, to author 
(Feb. 6, 2015) (on file with author). 
108 E-mail from Legal Counsel, Swiss Pharmaceutical Company, to author (on 
file with author) (alternations in original).  
109 Telephone Interview with President, Virginia-based Information Technol-
ogy Company (Jan. 20, 2015). 
110 Id. 
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more than twenty-five years after it entered into force. 
 
*   *   * 
 
In summary, the contract evidence derived from the dataset 
suggests that the overwhelming majority of U.S. contracts that ref-
erence the CISG do so for the sole purpose of excluding it.  It is 
common for U.S. companies to exclude the CISG from contracts to 
which it would never apply by its terms.  The number of U.S. con-
tracts in which the CISG is affirmatively chosen as the governing 
law—never large—is declining.  There does not appear to be a sin-
gle industry or geographic location within the United States in 
which companies have embraced the CISG as an alternative to na-
tional sales law.  And some companies that affirmatively opted in-
to the CISG in past years now report that their general practice is to 
exclude the treaty from their international sales contracts.  
The Global Sales Law Survey, it will be remembered, found 
that only 54% of U.S. attorneys “sometimes” or “always” advise 
their clients to opt out of the CISG.111  This result is impossible to 
reconcile with the results from the review of the dataset contracts.  
The dataset evidence suggests that the actual level of support for 
the CISG among U.S. lawyers is much, much lower than suggested 
by the Global Sales Law Survey.  Whatever the merits of the CISG, 
it has made scant little headway in gaining adherents among prac-
ticing lawyers in the United States in the twenty-eight years since it 
entered into force. 
 
5.   EVIDENCE OF VARYING PRACTICE IN CHINA 
 
Although U.S. companies have failed to embrace the CISG, the 
same cannot be said for companies in other nations.  There were a 
number of contracts in the dataset—nineteen to be exact—in which 
two foreign companies affirmatively chose the CISG as the law to 
govern their agreement.  A review of these wholly foreign con-
tracts is useful because it offers a sense of how the CISG is used 
when no U.S. company is a party to the transaction.  As it so hap-
pens, a review of these wholly foreign contracts reveals a pattern of 
practice that is quite different from the practice evidenced in the 
                                                     
111 See supra notes 3738. 
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U.S. agreements.  More than two-thirds of the wholly foreign con-
tracts (thirteen out of nineteen) were sales contracts involving a 
Chinese solar company.112  All of these agreements were negotiated 
after 2007.  All of them called for the sale of materials used in the 
construction of solar panels.113  And all of them affirmatively se-
lected the CISG as the governing law.114 
The finding that Chinese solar companies have embraced the 
CISG in their international sales contracts indicates that the per-
ceived utility of that treaty in transactional planning can vary by 
nationality and industry.  The mere fact that the CISG has made lit-
tle headway in the United States, in short, does not mean that it is 
failing to achieve its broader goal of facilitating international trade.  
Indeed, the fact that some Chinese companies routinely choose to 
opt in to the CISG suggests a possible pathway by which the CISG 
could come to be more broadly accepted by U.S. companies.115  As 
Lisa Spagnolo has written: “China’s relatively strong economic po-
sition . . . could ultimately serve to slowly force CISG exposure on 
more reluctant jurisdictions such as the US, Canada, and Australia, 
where environments of unfamiliarity and high learning costs so far 
still harbour automatic opt-outs.”116  While time alone will deter-
mine the extent to which Chinese choice-of-law preferences will in-
fluence U.S. practice, the claim that Chinese companies are mar-
ginally more supportive of the CISG than those in many other 
jurisdictions derives strong support from the patterns of practice 
among the dataset contracts.117 
This claim derives further support from a phone interview that 
I conducted with several representatives from a Chinese solar 
                                                     
112 Seven different Chinese solar companies were parties to at least one of 
these agreements. 
113 Three of the remaining contracts were entered into by a single Peruvian 
buyer seeking to obtain various pieces of large industrial equipment from sellers 
in Germany, Russia, Brazil, and Peru.  Two contracts were negotiated by a single 
Canadian fuel cell company with counterparties in South Korea and Japan.  In the 
final contract, a Brazilian company contracted to sell pharmaceuticals to a Chinese 
buyer. 
114 The counterparties to the contracts with Chinese solar companies were 
overwhelmingly located in Europe. 
115 See Lisa Spagnolo, Green Eggs and Ham:  The CISG, Path Dependence, and the 
Behavioural Economics of Lawyers’ Choices of Law in International Sales Contracts, 6 J. 
PRIV. INT’L L. 417, 427 – 28  (2010). 
116 Id. at 463. 
117 See Schroeter, supra note 12, at 654 (criticizing U.S. courts for requiring 
“explicit” opt-outs from the CISG and arguing that this approach is at odds with 
the purpose and legislative history of Article 6). 
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company based in Shanghai.  The company for which they worked 
had entered into a contract that selected the CISG to govern the 
sale of solar panels from the Chinese seller to a Spanish buyer.118  
One company representative, who dealt primarily with customers 
in Europe, explained that the company generally preferred to have 
its sales contracts governed by the CISG rather than by national 
law.119  When asked why, she stated that the CISG offered “very 
clear and simple remedies to the seller.”120  She observed that most 
of the company’s counterparties in Europe were “sophisticated 
buyers” and that these buyers were generally open to having the 
CISG govern the sales agreement.121  She also explained that in the 
rare cases in which a European counterparty insisted that the CISG 
be excluded, and balked at the selection of Chinese law, the com-
pany’s preference was to have the contract be governed by German 
national sales law because it is relatively easy for Chinese lawyers 
to research German law.122 
This same representative noted that it was somewhat unusual 
for the company to affirmatively name the CISG as the governing 
law in the contract.  Ordinarily, she explained, the company would 
simply select the law of Germany without making any reference to 
the CISG at all.123  In making this selection, she added, the compa-
ny was fully aware that the CISG would often apply as a default 
rule despite the fact that the treaty was not expressly mentioned 
anywhere in the agreement.124 
A different representative from the same company who dealt 
primarily with customers in Australia then pointed out that the 
company’s contracting practice was quite different when it came to 
Australian counterparties.125  The Australians, he explained, typi-
cally insisted that the CISG be excluded from their international 
sales contracts.126  Still another representative then chimed in to 
add that it was also common for customers in England to request 
                                                     
118 Telephone Interview with Legal Counsel at Chinese Solar Company (Feb. 
10, 2015). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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that the CISG be excluded.127  A different representative who dealt 
with the Japanese market added that there was a greater variety of 
practices when it came to Japanese buyers.  Some were happy to 
have the CISG govern the contract, while others insisted that it be 
excluded.128 
Significantly, the representatives from this particular Chinese 
solar company were the only attorneys I spoke to in the course of 
researching this Article who expressed real enthusiasm for the 
CISG.  In stark contrast to their U.S. counterparts, the CISG was the 
clear first preference of these Chinese attorneys when drafting 
choice-of-law clauses.  Their second preference was for Chinese or 
German national law.  When these options were unavailable, they 
would sometimes accept the national sales law of England, Aus-
tralia, or Japan.  
This enthusiasm for the CISG among Chinese solar companies 
may be attributable to the fact that Chinese national sales law bears 
more than a passing resemblance to the CISG.129  In 1999, China 
undertook a substantial revision of the country’s contract law.  In 
undertaking these revisions, the Chinese drafters “consulted and 
absorbed rules of the CISG on offer, acceptance, avoidance (termi-
nation), . . . liabilities for breach of contract, interpretation of a con-
tract, and sales contract.”130  This reliance has prompted at least 
one commentator to observe that “the CISG has quite a lot of im-
pact on [Chinese Contract Law].”131  In some ways, therefore, the 
Chinese embrace of the CISG is less a manifestation of a commit-
ment to the harmonization of international commercial law than an 
attempt to have the contract governed by a variant of Chinese na-
tional sales law.  For better or worse, most companies crave the 
familiar when it comes to choice of law.  To the extent that the 
CISG is more familiar to Chinese companies as a result of its hav-
ing been substantially incorporated into Chinese domestic law, it 
stands to reason that these companies would be more open to 
                                                     
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 See DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE, HAROLD HONGJU KOH & HANNAH 
L. BUXBAUM, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 255 (5th ed. 2014) (explaining 
how drafters of China’s 1999 Contract Law deliberately modeled provisions after 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the CISG). 
130 Shiyuan Han, The CISG and Modernisation of Chinese Contract Law, 17 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF INT’L TRADE AND ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE 
S. PAC. 71 (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
131 Id. at 79. 
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choosing the CISG in their international sales agreements. 
 
6.  SELECTING THE LAW OF A U.S. STATE 
 
The analysis in preceding Parts examined contract practice 
where the contract in question referenced the CISG.  This methodo-
logical approach may, however, fail to fully capture the nature of 
U.S. contract practice with respect to the CISG.  As noted above, it 
is possible for the CISG to supply the governing law even where a 
contract makes no mention of it.  When parties choose to have their 
international sales contract governed by the law of New York, for 
example, the contract will typically be governed by the CISG.  U.S. 
courts have reasoned that New York law necessarily includes all 
forms of federal law, and that the CISG—as a properly ratified fed-
eral treaty—is therefore a part of the law of New York.132  To select 
the law of New York, therefore, is to select the CISG indirectly.133  
If U.S. firms routinely select the law of a particular U.S. state in full 
knowledge that this selection will result in the application of the 
CISG, then it may well be that the treaty is making inroads into 
U.S. practice in ways that are not captured by the analysis in the 
preceding Parts.134 
In order to test this possibility, I worked with a team of re-
search assistants to assemble a secondary contract dataset.  This 
dataset consisted of international supply contracts filed with the 
SEC between 2011 and 2015.  Each research assistant was instruct-
ed to conduct a search for “supply /2 agreement” in the “Material 
Contracts” section of the EDGAR database.  These searches were 
conducted through the LexisNexis portal.  They resulted in 5,549 
hits.  A research assistant then reviewed each of these agreements 
to determine whether the contract at issue was an “international” 
supply agreement involving at least one U.S. party and one foreign 
                                                     
132 See supra note 61. 
133 See Am. Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:05-CV-650, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45003, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2005) (“The alleged contract in this 
case contains a provision selecting Georgia law as the law governing disputes un-
der the contract; however, the contract fails to expressly exclude the CISG by lan-
guage which affirmatively states it does not apply.”) (citation omitted). 
134 But see Ingeborg Schwenzer & Christopher Kee, International Sales Law—
The Actual Practice, 425 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 425, 435 (2011) (observing that “some 
parties do believe that they are excluding the CISG when simply not mentioning it 
in their choice-of-law clause”). 
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counterparty.  Once this process was complete, I was left with 248 
international supply agreements.   
I then reviewed each of these agreements to determine: (1) 
whether it excluded the CISG; (2) whether the foreign counterparty 
had its principal place of business in a country that had not ratified 
the CISG; (3) whether the agreement was an amendment to a prior 
agreement; (4) whether the agreement in question selected foreign 
law; and (5) whether it was a repeat of another contract in the sec-
ondary dataset.  If the answer to any of the preceding queries was 
in the affirmative, I eliminated the contract from the dataset.135  Af-
ter this review was complete, I was left with a group of forty-four 
international supply agreements, each of which contained a choice-
of-law clause selecting the law of a U.S. state and none of which 
excluded the CISG.  Although the CISG went unmentioned in 
these contracts, it would likely have supplied the governing law.   
 
I then sent letters to the forty-four U.S. companies that were 
party to each of these contracts to ask what they intended when 
they selected the law of a U.S. state to govern the contract.  Did 
they intend for the contract to be governed by the CISG?  Or did 
they intend for the contract to be governed by the chosen U.S. 
state’s version of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code?  I re-
ceived nine responses.136  Significantly, not a single respondent in-
dicated that the company intended to select the CISG when it chose 
the law of a U.S. state.   
 
One respondent stated:  “We did not consider CISG at all.”137  
Another noted (somewhat ruefully) that:  “We had no clue.  Our 
intent when we signed that agreement was absolutely that it was 
going to be governed by the law of the state of Florida.”138  Another 
                                                     
135 Ultimately, I eliminated:  forty-nine contracts from the secondary dataset 
because they opted out of the CISG; forty-four contracts because the counterparty 
had its place of business in a country that had not ratified the CISG; thirty-seven 
contracts because they selected the law of a country that had ratified the CISG; 
and one contract because it opted in to the CISG.  The remaining seventy-four 
contracts were excluded because they:  (1) were repeats; (2) were amendments to 
previous contracts; (3) were formatted in a manner that made them unreadable; or 
(4) did not contain a choice-of-law clause. 
136 In two cases, a company responded merely to inform me that it would not 
provide an answer to the question. 
137 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Pharmaceutical Company I, to author 
(Feb. 29, 2016) (on file with author). 
138 Telephone Interview with General Counsel, U.S. Manufacturing Company 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
  
236 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
respondent observed that:  “We did not intend for the stated choice 
of law to be eviscerated by the CISG.  We have an updated provi-
sion in our new contracts to explicitly disclaim the effect of the 
CISG, but several legacy agreements (done when we were less so-
phisticated) have not been updated.”139  Another respondent que-
ried whether the contract in question would actually have been 
governed by the CISG since it dealt with a number of issues in ad-
dition to sales, but stated that the company’s general policy was to 
opt out:  “We do not have a policy of choosing the CISG indirectly 
and we would affirmatively state that it was to govern if that was 
the intent.”140  Another respondent declared that: “I am not aware 
that we have ever had occasion to think about the point you 
raise.”141  Yet another respondent stated that:  “We would never se-
lect the law of Indiana, say, as a means of getting the [CISG].  We 
are just not that Machiavellian.”142  None of these responses are 
consistent with the notion that U.S. companies routinely select the 
CISG indirectly by choosing the law of a U.S. state.  They suggest 
instead that these companies are often unaware that the selection 
of U.S. state law will result in the application of the CISG and, con-
sequently, unknowingly fail to opt out.143 
These findings are generally consistent with ordinary intuitions 
about how corporate lawyers go about their work.  Transactional 
attorneys as a group, and particularly those attorneys who advise 
public companies, tend to prefer contracts that are clear to those 
that are opaque.  If these attorneys wanted the CISG to supply the 
governing law with respect to a contract, one would expect them to 
say as much in their choice-of-law clauses.144  One would not ex-
                                                                                                                        
(Apr. 11, 2016). 
139 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Technology Company, to Author 
(Mar. 4, 2016) (on file with author). 
140 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Pharmaceutical Company II, to Au-
thor (Feb. 29, 2016) (on file with author). 
141 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Energy Company I, to Author (Mar. 
18, 2016) (on file with author). 
142 Telephone Interview with General Counsel, U.S. Investment Company 
(Apr. 15, 2016). 
143 See Gilles Cuniberti, Is the CISG Benefiting Anybody?, 39 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1511, 1513 (2006) (arguing that “the vast majority of . . . buyers and 
sellers have not benefited [from the CISG], due to a lack of sophistication.”). 
144 To illustrate this point, consider the following two scenarios.  In the first, 
the parties say: “We would like for this contract to be governed by the CISG.  
Therefore, we will choose New York law but will make no mention of the CISG 
because we know that the choice of New York law will result in the CISG’s appli-
cation so long as we do not specifically exclude it.”  In the second, the parties say: 
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pect them to select the CISG indirectly by relying on an interpre-
tive rule that most, though not quite all, U.S. courts have decided 
to follow.145  Moreover, choice-of-law issues are not always at the 
forefront of the attorneys’ minds when they are drafting commer-
cial agreements.146  As one respondent explained: 
 
[I]n the ordinary course of commerce, where there are lots 
of contracts flying around all the time, and time/cost are 
always issues, it is not uncommon to agree to a choice of 
law without doing a detailed analysis of how that jurisdic-
tion’s laws work for you or against you.  Unless you have a 
crystal ball, you don’t know what your issues are going to 
be, so you don’t always know what to worry about . . . Of-
ten, you agree to go with a particular jurisdiction’s laws be-
cause (i) it’s a bigger state (e.g., NY or CA) that you know 
will have plenty of precedent to work with, (ii) you worry 
about being home towned by your counter-party (I know, 
venue is different from choice of law, but they do get 
blurred a little), (iii) you do have particular experience on a 
particular point that you think might be relevant, or (iv) 
something else dictates (lenders, a prime contract, etc.).  In 
truth, I usually worry more about the venue than the choice 
of law.147 
 
Amid these many competing priorities, this respondent con-
cluded that he “would bet that the folks on both sides of the 
agreement were not aware of the CISG and the manner in which it 
                                                                                                                        
“We would like this contract to be governed by the CISG.  Therefore, we will ref-
erence the CISG and specify that New York law shall govern all matters not cov-
ered by the CISG.”  While it is certainly possible that some U.S. attorneys whose 
clients wanted the CISG to apply would adopt the first approach to contract draft-
ing, it seems more plausible that most would adopt the second. 
145 At least one court has declined to follow this interpretive rule.  See Am. 
Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties, 411 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 (D.R.I. 2006) 
(concluding that a choice-of-law clause selecting the law of Rhode Island was suf-
ficient for the court to deny the application of the CISG to the case). 
146 See LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 698 
(7th ed. 2015) (“[S]urprisingly often, the parties do not even bother to research the 
chosen law before they include a clause selecting it.”). 
147 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Energy Company II, to Author (Mar. 
3, 2016) (on file with author). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
  
238 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
trumps local law.”148  
 
*   *   * 
 
 In light of the foregoing analysis, it seems clear that the con-
clusion set forth above—that the CISG has no real constituency 
among public companies in the United States—still holds.149  The 
data generated by the contracts in the secondary dataset provide 
little support for the notion that U.S. companies routinely select the 
CISG indirectly by choosing the law of a particular U.S. state.  This 
data also suggests that the interpretive rule followed by most U.S. 
judges to date—that U.S. state law necessarily includes federal law, 
and that the selection of law of a particular state amounts to the 
choice of the CISG—does not necessarily align with the expecta-
tions of U.S. companies entering into state law contracts.150  In 
summary, there is no evidence from the secondary dataset that U.S. 
companies that select the law of a U.S. state want the CISG to gov-
ern their international supply agreements.151 
 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
In much of the legal literature, the fact that the CISG has been 
ratified by eight-five nations constitutes incontrovertible evidence 
of the treaty’s success.  The problem with this account is that it fails 
                                                     
148 Id. 
149 When a U.S. company is a party to an international sales contract contain-
ing a choice-of-law clause selecting foreign law, there may be an element of 
gamesmanship.  In these cases, the U.S. company may strategically concede the 
choice of governing law in full knowledge that the contract will be governed by 
the CISG rather than the national sales law of the foreign nation.  The Chinese so-
lar company discussed in the previous Part followed precisely this strategy when 
it agreed on its international sales contracts being governed by German law.  See 
supra note 124 and accompanying text.  It would make little sense, however, for a 
U.S. company to follow such a strategy when the law chosen is the law of U.S. ju-
risdiction. 
150 See generally Johnson, supra note 61 (discussing cases in which parties in a 
suit had chosen a state law to govern without realizing CISG would apply by de-
fault). 
151 Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 
393, 414 (2004) (“If the reason for the gap was that the parties did not even consid-
er the issue addressed by the default rule, it is much harder to infer consent to the 
rule.”). 
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to acknowledge that private parties can choose to exclude the CISG 
from their international sales contracts.  The fact that U.S. compa-
nies routinely choose to exclude the CISG necessarily calls into 
question whether the CISG is actually achieving its goal of facilitat-
ing international trade.  In order to answer to this question, it 
would be helpful if scholars were to conduct additional contract 
surveys outside the United States in order to determine whether 
U.S. practice is representative or atypical.  As discussed above, the 
Global Sales Survey arguably overstates the level of support that 
the CISG enjoys within the United States by a significant margin.  
If this same survey also overstates the CISG’s support in foreign 
jurisdictions, such a finding would necessitate a thorough reevalu-
ation of the treaty’s efficacy. 
Even in the absence of additional information relating to for-
eign contract practice, the evidence relating to U.S. practice raises 
difficult questions about the current role of the CISG in resolving 
transnational disputes in U.S. courts.  As things currently stand, 
the CISG often applies only where the U.S. contracting party is un-
sophisticated.152  In a number of cases in which the CISG has come 
up in U.S. litigation, the parties seem to have had no idea that it 
would apply ex ante.153  It is plausible—indeed, it is likely—that 
                                                     
152 Sophisticated U.S. companies are more likely to opt out of the CISG.  E-
mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Technology Company, to Author (Mar. 4, 2016) 
(on file with the author) (explaining that “[w]e did not intend for the stated choice 
of law to be eviscerated by the CISG.  We have an updated provision in our new 
contracts to explicitly disclaim the effect of the CISG, but several legacy agree-
ments (done when we were less sophisticated) have not been updated.”) (emphasis 
added). 
153 Reimann, supra note 62, at 123 – 24 (finding that the CISG applied in many 
cases because the parties did not opt out, rather than because they meant for the 
CISG to apply); see also Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 
2d 426, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“In this case, the parties each attempted to opt out of 
the CISG, but could not agree on the law to displace it . . . [and so] their competing 
choices must fall away, leaving the CISG to fill the void by its own self-executing 
force.”).  There appears to be only one published case in the United States in 
which the parties affirmatively chose the CISG to govern their agreement.  See 
Harry M. Flechtner & Ronald A. Brand, Opting In to the CISG:  Avoiding the Red-
line Products Problems, in A TRIBUTE TO JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY 97 (Mads Bryde An-
dersen & René Franz Henschel eds., Djøf Publishing, Copenhagen 2015).  In that 
case, however, the parties also chose the law of South Africa—a nation that has not 
ratified the CISG—as the law to govern their agreement.  Id.  This inconsistency 
undercut the notion that the parties in question truly wanted the CISG to govern 
their agreement.  In light of the confusion engendered by the conflicting choice-of-
law clauses, the court ultimately applied New Jersey law.  See FPM Fin. Serv., LLC 
v. Redline Prods. Ltd., Civil Action No. 10-6118 (MAS) (LHG), 2013 WL 5288005, 
at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2013). 
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many of these parties would have excluded the CISG if they had 
known enough to do so.  This raises serious questions as to wheth-
er the CISG accurately captures the unstated preferences of the U.S. 
parties to these international sales agreements.  Over time, it may 
be that the cases generated by international sales contracts that fail 
to exclude the CISG will produce a body of case law that may lead 
more sophisticated companies to adopt it.  For now, however, the 
burden of developing this case law would seem to fall primarily 
upon U.S. litigants who do not know enough to exclude it.  
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